


.....



# REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN VALUES

HONOURING LOEK HALMAN'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY

---

*Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben (Eds)*

# FOREWORD

A BOOK MADE BY FRIENDS,

A BOOK ABOUT VALUES,

A BOOK ON LOEK

.....

The book before you is dedicated as a *Festschrift* to Loek Halman on the occasion of his retirement from our university. The rich and varied contributions it contains were written by many researchers involved in the European Values Study (EVS), some from its very inception. Loek's farewell coincides with the presentation of the new edition of the *Atlas of European Values*. It marks a new phase, for Loek personally, but also for this important project that the academic community at Tilburg University is rightly proud of.

Every page of this book reflects the friendship and respect that Loek inspires and also the great commitment to that important study into values over the past decades: European values, first and foremost, but as the study will show, closely linked to values elsewhere in the world, the World Values.

This moment also coincides with tensions rising in Europe and the world at large. It is becoming increasingly clear, also thanks to this study, that underlying what appear to be economic conflicts are actually, deeply and essentially, tensions between values. Dominique Moïsi's *The Geopolitics of Emotion* seems to be rooted in the geopolitics of values.

The new *Atlas*, Loek's last, is published at a moment when many people will understand these values differently from what they thought about them only a few months ago. At the moment that I am writing this foreword, a terrible war is raging, the ramifications of which for Europe and its values we can only guess at. Values, Europe, values of and within Europe: they continue to be a truly essential subject of research.

It is an honour for me to be invited to write the foreword to this book. I will resist the temptation to relate the history of the EVS, which I have been following with more than ordinary interest since the 1990s. The opening chapter, prepared by the editors of this book, will adequately demonstrate that this history has largely coincided with Loek Halman's academic as well as his personal commitment to this project. In it, he is described as a quiet, somewhat introverted person. I can partially agree with that: as I remember Loek, he was firm, outspoken, and clear when it came to protecting the quality of a project against the increasingly frequent and urgent requests for snap judgements on those European values. Quietly waiting for the research to be completely finished, because completeness, diligence and integrity came first. He was in fact able to communicate that in a quite extraverted way. And not only when he was on a plane ...

That firmness also came over him in meetings with people who had sometimes backed this project with funding and other forms of support for decades. Loek tirelessly and at the same time tactfully proffered suggestions for new opportunities.

That unstoppable engagement was inspired by great motivation for the continuation of this study: it was as if Loek could still feel the encouragement of Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moor, two colleagues who are no longer with us, but

whose great stimulus of Loek's passionate dedication was also perceptible to those who did not know them.

He spoke about them with great love and respect, and also about the initial years of the project, which often required pioneering efforts in various ways. With many anecdotes – sometimes he told them more than once – you knew when he was going to finish them with a somewhat affable smile or a stifled laugh. He could tell great stories about the collaboration with the World Values Survey, in particular with Ron Inglehart. This will undoubtedly have been the case the other way around as well, because Loek was not easily put out by anything: he skillfully defended the nuances and the ambiguity in and reflected by the research results, almost as if that was a European value in itself, against the, in his opinion, rather strong conclusions presented Anglo-American style. It was great to discuss them with Loek. He would sit at his desk shaking with laughter sometimes. I have fond memories of these times.

Loek's efforts and commitment were nothing short of crucial at moments when future or essential funding was in the balance: he often was the quietly reliable and amiable ambassador whose tireless work inspired many colleagues to go canvassing once more. Make a few additional phone calls.


I know from my own experience that he was a very helpful mentor. As a datasets expert *par excellence*, he liked to contribute ideas based on the input they provided, offered suggestions for opportunities not yet exploited and, smiling broadly, would share with you the usually beautiful results that they yielded.

When you read the contributions to this *Festschrift* compiled for you, Loek, you will yourself experience in others that great commitment to EVS, for which Tilburg University is so infinitely grateful to you. In this new phase in your life, you will see how you have been a co-builder of a kind of cathedral. You helped build a project that transcends generations and which can be added to in new ways with every new phase. Building cathedrals: that is typically European too, in a firm belief that values change, but also provide foundations. Maybe for that very reason.

All the best to you!

*Wim van de Donk*

*Rector Magnificus and President of the Tilburg University Executive Board*



# SERIES EDITORS

## PREFACE

.....

This book is the second volume in the European Values book Series, published at Open Press TiU, Tilburg University, right after the first volume, a new edition of the *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times* by Loek Halman, Tim Reeskens, Inge Sieben, and Marga van Zundert. Both volumes are special projects. Based on academic insights into the study of European values and based on data from the European Values Study project, they hope to reach a wide audience, beyond academia. The *Atlas of European Values* does so by offering the readership visually attractive maps, graphs, and charts, accompanied by short texts on social science theories and interviews with values scholars to explain the findings. The second volume is a *Liber Amicorum* to honour the work of Loek Halman, and his immense contribution to the European Values Study, a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal research project on values in Europe.



Both volumes thus fit the main purpose of the European Values Series to publish scholarly work on European values. The Series is a leading platform for the comparative study of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. It primarily publishes values research that seeks to uncover patterns and trends in important life domains, such as politics, religion and morale, family and gender, migration, work, welfare etc., and that adopts a comparative perspective on values such as cross-national comparisons, a longitudinal perspective, comparisons across social groups. The Series is grounded in work from the social sciences, although contributions from other disciplines such as philosophy and history are welcome as well. In this way, the Series hopes to contribute to the academic and public debate on European values. To facilitate this, the European Values Series is published open access at Open Press TiU, Tilburg University.

This second volume *Reflections on European Values. Honouring Loek Halman's Contribution to the European Values Study* was edited by Ruud Luijkx, Tim Reeskens, and Inge Sieben, with a preface by prof. dr. Wim van de Donk, Rector Magnificus and President of the Tilburg University Executive Board. The book contains more than thirty contributions on the study of European values and deals with theoretical and methodological reflections on the European Values Study, the sociology of religion, comparative studies into European values, research on values in the Netherlands, and provides values insights from national case studies. All these topics reflect Loek Halman's research interests and paint a detailed values landscape of Europe. We hope that this volume, and the books to follow, will inspire many scholars studying European values.

*Inge Sieben and Vera Lomazzi*  
*Editors European Values Series*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

<b>Preface</b>	4
<i>Wim van de Donk</i>	
<b>Series Editors Preface</b>	8
<i>Inge Sieben, Vera Lomazzi</i>	
<b>Table of Contents</b>	10
1. Turning a Page in the History of European Values Research	14
<i>Ruud Luijkx, Inge Sieben, Tim Reeskens</i>	
<b>Theoretical and Methodological Reflections on the European Values Study</b>	
2. EVS and Grand Theory: A Fruitful Alliance	30
<i>Wil Arts</i>	
3. Conflicts of European Values in Times of Turbulence	44
<i>Georgy Fotev</i>	
4. Beware! Surveys Are Not Universal Tools	56
<i>Ole Preben Riis</i>	
5. The Data of the European Values Study from 1981 towards 2026: Achievements, Synergies, Impact and Future	68
<i>Ruud Luijkx, Angelica M. Maineri, Giovanni Borghesan</i>	
6. Challenges for Comparative Surveys in Europe: Five Theses	84
<i>Dominique Joye, Christof Wolf</i>	
7. What Do Changes in the EVS Questionnaire Reveal?	100
<i>Pierre Bréchon</i>	
8. Does Within-Country Agreement on Beliefs matter for Ranking Countries on Values Dimensions? Evidence from the European Values Study 2017	114
<i>John Gelissen</i>	
<b>Sociology of Religion</b>	
9. Modernization and Secularization in Spain: Evidence from Values Surveys	134
<i>María Silvestre Cabrera, Edurne Bartolomé Peral, Javier Elzo Imaz</i>	
10. Saints, Scholars, Sceptics and Secularists: The Changing Faith of	

	Religious Practice in Ireland, 1981-2020	150
	<i>Michael J. Breen, Ross Macmillan</i>	
11.	The Transmission of Religious Values	166
	<i>David Voas, Ingrid Storm</i>	
12.	Between Romania and Hungary: Religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania	178
	<i>Dénes Kiss, Gergely Rosta, Bogdan Voicu</i>	
13.	Secularization and Values: Exploring Changes in the Religious Factor in Preferences for Obedience and Autonomy	196
	<i>Inge Sieben, Katya Ivanova</i>	
14.	The Impact of the Child Abuse Scandals on Trust in the Church: Empirical Evidence from Belgium	208
	<i>Koen Abts, Bart Meuleman</i>	
15.	The Rise of the Nones in Iceland	222
	<i>Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir, Inga Run Saemundsdottir, Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir</i>	
16.	Trust Thy Neighbour. Contextualizing the Relationship Between Non-Religiosity and Tolerance	236
	<i>Peter Achterberg, Christof Van Mol</i>	
17.	Populism and Religion: Effects of Religious Affiliation on Populist Attitudes	248
	<i>Yilmaz Esmer</i>	
 <b>Comparative Studies into European Values</b>		
18.	Living Arrangement and Values of Young Adults in 1990 and 2017: Bridging Generations	264
	<i>Guy Moors</i>	
19.	Gender Equality Values and Cultural Orientations	282
	<i>Vera Lomazzi</i>	
20.	Are Childrearing Values' Preferences in Europe Associated to Socioeconomic Development and Social Inequalities?	300
	<i>Alice Ramos, Jorge Vala</i>	
21.	Changes in Work Values Under the Influence of International Migration	320
	<i>Bogdan Voicu</i>	

22. Income Inequality and Acceptance of Corrupt Acts <i>Ioana Pop, Caroline Dewilde</i>	334
23. Income, Values and Subjective Wellbeing in Europe: Results From the EVS 1999-2017 Data <i>Ruud Muffels</i>	348
24. Is Political Protest in Western Europe Becoming Less of a Prerogative of the Young and of the Left? <i>Paul Dekker, Andries van den Broek</i>	362

### **Research on Values in The Netherlands**

25. Same Old, Same Old? Value Change and Stability in the Netherlands <i>Erwin Gielens, Quita Muis</i>	376
26. You Can Look (But You Better Not Touch): Who Justifies Casual Sex Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic? <i>Tim Reeskens, Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld</i>	388
27. Conditionality of Solidarity in The Netherlands: An Analysis of Three Waves of the European Values Study <i>Wim van Oorschot, Erwin Gielens, Femke Roosma</i>	404

### **Values Insights from National Case Studies**

28. The Nordic Exceptionalism Revisited <i>Susanne Wallman Lundåsen</i>	420
29. Danish Values: How Special Are They? <i>Morten Frederiksen, Peter Gundelach</i>	434
30. Traditional and Post-Materialist Values About Family and Marriage in Greece <i>Penny Panagiotopoulou, Aikaterini Gari, Anastassios Emvalotis</i>	448
31. Gender Role Attitudes in the Macedonian Sociocultural Context <i>Mihajlo Popovski, Antoanela Petkovska, Ilo Trajkovski, Konstantin Minoski</i>	462
32. Transformation of Values in Croatia in Democratic Times <i>Josip Balaban</i>	474

**Contributors** **488**

**European Values Series** **504**

**Colophon** **506**

# 1. TURNING A PAGE IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN VALUES RESEARCH

---

*Ruud Luijkx*

*Tim Reeskens*

*Inge Sieben*

## **1.1 Honouring Mister EVS**

This book *Reflections on European Values* is a *Liber Amicorum* to honour Loek Halman's contribution to the European Values Study (EVS). Before we present you with an overview of the contributions in this volume, we will first bring you back to the beginning of the EVS; we will start this itinerary in 1978 and end with present day developments, highlighting the crucial role Loek played all along.

At the end of the 1970s, at a time when European integration was intensifying, a group of scholars witnessed a gradual decline in the dominance of Christianity. From this observation, they were interested in the following substantial questions: (1) Do Europeans share common values? (2) Are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what directions? (3) Do Christian values continue to permeate European life and culture? (4) Is a coherent alternative meaning system replacing Christianity? (5) What are the implications of these developments for European unity? To address these questions, the European Value Systems

Study Group (EVSSG) was founded in 1978; in tandem, a Foundation and a Steering Committee were established. Under the leadership of Ruud de Moor (Tilburg University) and Jan Kerkhofs (KU Leuven), the EVSSG aimed at designing and conducting a ground-breaking empirical study into the moral and social values underlying European social and political institutions.

After intense theoretical and methodological discussions, the first wave was carried out in ten European countries in 1981. All surveyed countries were member states of the then European Community except Greece, yet, the sample included Spain, as well as Norway, Canada, and the US. At this start of what would ultimately become the longest cross-national survey project into moral and social values, there was no sign of Loek Halman in the EVS, as he was still pursuing Master studies, which he completed in the mid-1980s. In 1984, he became the secretary of the Steering Committee (which later turned into the Executive Committee) of EVS. Loek held this position until 2013, after which he became the Chair of the Executive Committee. He held this position until 2020, when he stepped down and Ruud Luijkx was elected to succeed Loek.

Loek's scholarly interest lay in the study of values, so he was involved in the analysis of EVS data from the first wave onwards. One of his first publications regarded an edited volume on tradition, secularisation, and individualisation in the Netherlands within the European context (Halman, Heunks, De Moor & Zanders, 1987). He defended his doctoral dissertation, supervised by Ruud de Moor and Jacques Hageaars, in 1991. His dissertation was published (in Dutch) as a monograph *Values in the Western World: An International Exploration of Values in Western Society* (Halman, 1991). In this study, Loek describes the differences and similarities of several relevant values in the countries surveyed in the first wave of the EVS, fuelling a discussion about Western societies between tradition and modernity. The study also put forward clear positions on the definition of 'values', and elaborated on problems when conducting comparative research on this topic. Loek's PhD dissertation used analysis techniques that were very innovative at the time, such as latent class analysis. Using this technique, Loek, together with Jacques Hageaars, published results on ideal types in the *European Sociological Review* (Hageaars & Halman, 1989).



In the meanwhile, the Steering Committee prepared the second wave of EVS data collection. From the beginning, the idea was to have a survey every ten years. Because the first wave was in 1981 and the second in 1990, this was changed into nine-year intervals; this strategy satisfied the Age-Period-Cohort specialists in the team. The late 1980s was an exciting period in European history with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall. The collapse of the Soviet Empire offered the opportunity to further extend the geographical coverage of the project to Central and Eastern European countries. The questionnaire of the second EVS wave was more or less a replication of the first wave; the survey was fielded in 27 countries. During this wave of data collection there was close cooperation with Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart organized and coordinated surveys in countries not participating in the EVS. This combined effort generated the World Values Survey (WVS) in the mid-1990s.

After the collection of the second wave of EVS data, Loek wanted to advance the study of Europe's moral landscape. Together with Peter Ester and Ruud de Moor, he edited a volume on value change in Europe and North America (Ester, Halman & De Moor, 1993). Having two EVS waves completed, this yielded the opportunity to look more into changes over time, but also between cohorts. Numerous publications were written, many of them covering the role of religion in a secularising society (e.g., Halman & Riis, 1999) and individualisation (Halman, 1996).

In the 1990s, EVS expanded further and included 33 countries in the third wave of data collection. The Founding Fathers of the EVS became less active by the end of the 1990s: Ruud de Moor passed away in 2001, Jan Kerkhofs in 2015. Besides being the National Programme Director for the Netherlands, Loek became the Secretary of the EVS Foundation in this period and the Programme Director of EVS fieldwork. In these functions, Loek coordinated the third EVS wave from Tilburg University, in close cooperation with GESIS (Cologne) and the Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services (NIWI, now part of DANS). To make the fieldwork of 1999 successful, Loek travelled to all corners of Europe to visit national EVS teams. The questionnaire of this third EVS wave took into account several new topics, including solidarity (e.g., with elderly, disabled, immigrants), social capital (networks, trust, civism), democracy, and work ethos.

The third wave of the EVS generated a lot of scientific output; many books and articles were published. Together with Wil Arts and Jacques Hageaars, Loek published *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (Arts, Hageaars & Halman, 2003) which asked the question whether cultural unity or diversity will prevail in Europe. With Wil Arts, Loek wrote *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*, responding to questions on cross-national differences and similarities in values (Arts & Halman, 2004). These books were published in the very successful European Values Study book series at Brill Publishers in Leiden. Loek was co-editor of the EVS Series, first together with Wil Arts (2003-2007), and later with Koen van Eijck (2007-2010) and Paul de Graaf (2007-2022), and he was its driving force: along with being the Series co-editor, Loek was (co)editor of no fewer than 13 out of the 18 volumes in the EVS Series.

From this third wave of EVS data onwards, Loek took the initiative to produce an *Atlas of European Values* as part of the EVS Series. The first one was published in 2005 and presented in the Hague to Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende in the presence of members of the *corps diplomatique* (Halman, Luijkx & Van Zundert, 2005). The *Atlas of European Values* summarised the results of the EVS project for a general audience by presenting the values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of Europeans at the turn of the millennium through visuals, first and foremost in maps, but also in relevant graphs and charts. The second *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century* (Halman, Sieben & Van Zundert, 2011), was based on the fourth wave of data collection, and was presented to Luuk van Middelaar, member of the Cabinet of Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council. The most recent *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times* (Halman, Reeskens, Sieben & Van Zundert, 2022) is based on the fifth and last wave of data collection and is introduced at the European Values Conference 2022 in Brussels.

Another important initiative that was initiated from the third EVS wave onwards, was the publication of sourcebooks. These sourcebooks are of great value to policy makers and journalists, because they give easy albeit basic access to the data. After a sourcebook for the third wave (Halman, 2001), there

were also sourcebooks jointly with WVS: one concerned the EVS and WVS surveys around 2000 (Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrano & Halman, 2004), the other displayed trends based on the value surveys since 1981 (Halman, Inglehart, Díez-Medrano, Luijkx, Moreno & Basáñez, 2008). After the fourth wave, a sourcebook was published of the trends within EVS from wave 1 to 4 (Luijkx, Halman, Sieben, Brislinger & Quandt, 2017).

The fieldwork for the fourth EVS wave was initiated in 2008. To allow for the study of over-time changes, the questionnaire was largely identical to the one of the third wave. New quality improvements in sampling and translation were reached. In the meanwhile, Paul de Graaf took over as Chair of the EVS Executive Committee, with Loek as Secretary. Loek was very active in fundraising for the fourth wave and with great success. In the end the survey was fielded in 47 countries, making EVS the survey *par excellence* with the largest geographical coverage in Europe. Besides the already mentioned *Atlas of European Values*, two important publications were co-authored by Loek. With Wil Arts, Loek edited the volume *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe* (Arts & Halman, 2014) on cross-national differences and similarities in values across Europe, aimed at an international audience. For a local audience, Loek and Inge Sieben published the book *Respect Man!* (Halman & Sieben, 2011), for which they invited several colleagues to discuss values in the Netherlands.

At the EVS meeting in Bar (Montenegro) in 2013, new officials were elected: Loek became the Chair of the Executive Committee, Malina Voicu the Secretary (later followed-up by Vera Lomazzi), David Voas the Chair of the Theory Group, and Ruud Luijkx the Chair of the Methodology Groups. The process of creating the questionnaire and preparing the fieldwork for the fifth wave started during this meeting. Many meetings of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee, the Theory Group and the Methodology Group followed in Milan, Bilbao, Vienna, Warsaw, Athens, Cologne, Ljubljana, and Tblisi, always under the inspiring leadership of Loek. Actually, there is a story to tell about these meetings. The authors of this introductory chapter in Loek's *Liber Amicorum* know Loek as a quiet and somewhat introverted person. While going on these international journeys, a kind of transformation happened to him in the airplane. When landing approached, he would insert his earplugs, troubled by

the changing air pressure. Upon arrival at these international destinations, Loek was transformed into Mister EVS: excitedly and in a hurry, he ran off the airplane, eager to explore the visiting country and ready to see his friends and colleagues of EVS. At the same time, he preferred very early breakfasts, so as not to be confronted with EVS questions and issues too early in the morning.

At this very moment, the fieldwork of the fifth wave of the EVS is concluded. Again, a lot of effort was put in by Loek and the EVS Foundation to raise money for fieldwork in those countries where no funds were available. There was success, but the amount raised this time was not enough to cover the whole of Europe and the number of countries in the final dataset will most likely be 39. The first version of the integrated data file contains most countries and is publicly available, already leading to a number of country studies (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Netherlands, and Spain). Loek and the Executive Committee strengthened the ties with WVS in the prelude to this wave. This led to a very close cooperation, where EVS took the lead in Europe, and WVS in the rest of the world. In the questionnaires, there was a common core for both WVS and EVS data collections. Results of their fieldwork are available as Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2021 Dataset.

The comparative study of values, using the EVS waves, was also the core of Loek Halman's teaching activities at Tilburg University. He passed on his passion to combine both theoretical and empirical value research to future generations, as students had to write scientific papers using EVS data in his courses on Values in Europe (Bachelor's programme in sociology), National and Regional Identities (Bachelor's and Premaster's programme in Sociology, together with Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld) and in the course Learning Project: Values and Civil Society in Europe (Bachelor's programme in the major social sciences of Liberal Arts and Sciences, together with Paul Dekker). In addition, he supervised theses of numerous students in the Bachelor's and Master's programmes in Sociology, as well as from Liberal Arts and Sciences, and was the organizer of the December Student Research Symposium, where students presented their work. In this way, he introduced several cohorts of students to the work of EVS and its scholars.

Loek retired from Tilburg University in September 2021. Anticipating this major moment in his professional life, Loek decided to step down from the Executive Committee in October 2020 and from the EVS Foundation in the summer of 2021. The European Values Study is preparing for its sixth wave of data collection taking place in 2026, as well as future horizons for values research. Present days are exciting and worrying times with outside threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To maintain a long-term comparative survey programme such as EVS requires vision and intensive cooperation with many partners inside and outside the EVS. The EVS community is grateful for the way Loek shaped all this in the last decades and we will continue his work in the future.

## **1.2 Outline of this Volume**

For this *Liber Amicorum*, a ‘book of friends’, we invited two groups of colleagues to write a contribution. On the one hand, we approached several EVS National Programme Directors (NPD). Having been the Secretary, and later the Chair of the Executive Committee of the EVS, Loek established and maintained solid relationships with these NPDs throughout the years. On the other hand, we got in touch with current and former colleagues, co-authors, and *compagnons de route* of Loek Halman. These scholars either have been inspired by the work of Loek, or inspired Loek by joint work on the study of relevant moral and social values, attitudes or behaviour, often in a comparative perspective. The fact that this volume combines 31 different chapters underscores how well-respected and loved Loek was and is among his peers.

We asked the authors to write a chapter of approximately 3,000 words each. Even though we did not impose topical restrictions to authors, evidently, the only demand was to relate to the EVS in whatever way possible. The result is this monograph that can be summarized in the motto of the European Union “United in Diversity”. This motto was frequently used by Loek to reflect upon findings from the EVS to describe values similarities and differences across European countries. To provide coherence in this book, we have grouped the chapters in five themes that also reflect Loek’s research interests, namely theo-

retical and methodological reflections on the European Values Study, chapters on the sociology of religion, comparative studies, studies on the Netherlands, and additional country case studies.

The section *Theoretical and Methodological Reflections on the European Values Study* is kicked off by Wil Arts (Chapter 2). In his contribution, Arts reflects on the use of grand theories *vis-a-vis* partial middle-range theories to explain value differences and values change. Georgy Fotev (Chapter 3) dedicates his chapter to the relevance of values in current turbulent times. He shows that value prioritisation is a valid way of managing tensions between values. To make the transition from theory to empirical research, Ole Preben Riis (Chapter 4) discusses common limitations inherent in the use of social surveys for social science research, including the coverage of the sample frame, the extent to which interviews can be leading, and the diagnosis that abstract concepts are not always easy to measure using standardized questionnaires. Ruud Luijkx, Angelica Maineri and Giovanni Borghesan (Chapter 5) present an overview of the EVS fieldwork over time. The authors review the coverage of countries, innovations in methodology used, and look ahead to the next wave of data collection in 2026. From their year-long experience as members of, respectively, the EVS Methods and Theory Groups, Dominique Joye and Christof Wolf (Chapter 6) discuss the challenges that the EVS is facing, thereby reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the EVS in comparison to other cross-national research projects, including the European Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme. Continuing on methodological reflections is Pierre Bréchon's contribution (Chapter 7), which shines a light on the changes in EVS questions over time: as is well known, some items in the EVS have known a long history, while some items are very recent. The choice of items, as Bréchon argues, reflects societal transformations, political agendas, and strategies among EVS scholars. The final methodological chapter is written by John Ge-lissen (Chapter 8) and reviews limitations in the use of country averages of values if these averages do not account for variation within countries.

The second section of this book are contributions on the *Sociology of Religion*. The sizeable number of submissions on this topic not only relates to the topical interest of the EVS community, but also reflects Loek Halman's theoreti-

cal approach into the cross-national study of values using the EVS. One of the main theoretical models is the secularisation thesis, which forms the theoretical basis in the contribution by María Silvestre Cabrera, Edurne Bartolomé Peral, and Javier Elzo Imaz (Chapter 9). The authors demonstrate that in Spain, the process of secularisation is discernible, albeit with clear differences in this process among different sociodemographic groups. Studying the Irish case, Michael Breen and Ross Macmillan (Chapter 10) show a gradual decline in religiosity between 1981 to the COVID-19 era. This volume then proceeds with some underlying mechanisms for the secularisation thesis. David Voas and Ingrid Storm (Chapter 11) write on religious socialisation by parents. While they find that individuals who see religion as important are more committed to religious socialisation, they do not find different effects between more secular or more religious countries. Related to the study of socialisation is the interest of Dénes Kiss, Gergely Rosta and Bogdan Voicu (Chapter 12) in the religiosity of the Hungarian minority in the Romanian region of Transylvania. The authors show that the Hungarian minority resembles Romanian society more than the Hungarian one. Continuing on the study of socialisation of values, Inge Sieben and Katya Ivanova (Chapter 13) assess the extent to which religiosity plays a role in parental values, departing from the question whether religious people value obedience more and autonomy less in the upbringing of children. Koen Abts and Bart Meuleman (Chapter 14) focus on trust in the Church in Belgium. Applying an innovative panel design based on the fourth wave of the EVS, they show that the handling of the child abuse cases has eroded trust in the Church among churchgoers. Further expanding on trust in the Church, Gudbjorg Andrea Jonsdottir, Inga Run Saemundsdottir, and Gudny Bergthora Tryggvadottir (Chapter 15) demonstrate that in Iceland, a continuous decline in trust in the Church explains a rise of the so-called ‘nones’: people who do not belong to any religious denomination. In two contributions, the link between religion and out-group attitudes is investigated. First, Peter Achterberg and Christof van Mol (Chapter 16) study whether religious Europeans or the so-called ‘religious nones’ are more tolerant towards immigrants. They observe that although tolerance is higher in secularised societies, the non-religious are less tolerant towards immigrants in secular countries. Second, Yilmaz Esmer (Chapter 17) asks the question whether religiosity is related to populist attitudes. Based on a scale that taps into feelings of institutional distrust and apathy towards out-

groups, Esmer argues that adherents of Islam display more populist attitudes than Protestants.

The third section of this volume deals with *Comparative Studies into European Values*. Loek has extensively studied values in cross-national perspective, justifying this distinct section in his *Liber Amicorum*. A first contribution in this section is written by Guy Moors (Chapter 18), who replicates his earlier work on the Second Demographic Transition using most recent EVS data. Moors shows that differences in young people's living arrangements re-emerge in the generation surveyed in 2017. Vera Lomazzi (Chapter 19) studies whether the measurement of gender equality attitudes in the European Values Study passes cross-national validity. After finding confirmation for equivalent measurement, Lomazzi shows that gender attitudes are firmly embedded in cultural traditions. Subsequently, Alice Ramos and Jorge Vala (Chapter 20) question whether childrearing values are related to socioeconomic development and social inequality. They demonstrate that autonomy is valued more while authoritarianism is valued less in wealthy societies. Bogdan Voicu (Chapter 21) focuses on the subjective importance of work, as he notices a decreased salience of it over time. He shows that the host society has a strong imprint on the importance of work among immigrants. In their chapter, Ioana Pop and Caroline Dewilde (Chapter 22) replicate earlier research on income inequality and the acceptance of corrupt acts, combining several EVS waves. They show that although changes in income inequality do not explain justifying corruption, persistent differences across European countries in the acceptance of corrupt acts exist. Ruud Muffels (Chapter 23) also touches upon the consequences of living in unequal societies, as well as the relevance of values in explaining subjective wellbeing. He shows that subjective wellbeing is higher in countries where people have trust in each other, and where intrinsic work values are high and extrinsic work values are low. Last but not least, in one of the few contributions that focus on behaviour instead of values or attitudes, Paul Dekker and Andries van den Broek (Chapter 24) study generational differences in protest behaviour. The authors show that a normalisation in protest proneness is taking place, i.e., political protest is no longer a prerogative of the young, but occurs across the entire life-span.



A fourth section of this book concerns *Research on Values in the Netherlands* and is an introduction to the other national case studies. Even though this section is not sizeable, we are of the opinion that the Netherlands deserves a special spot in this volume, because Loek for a long time was the National Programme Director for the European Values Study Netherlands and advanced the study of values in the Netherlands. Erwin Gielens and Quita Muis (Chapter 25) question the extent to which some value orientations have shifted drastically, while others have remained rather stable. An analysis of Dutch longitudinal EVS data shows that while conservatism and religiosity have declined, there is a stronger priority of materialist value orientations. In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, Tim Reeskens and Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld (Chapter 26) study justifying casual sex before and during the coronavirus crisis. Their analysis shows that people concerned by the virus are justifying casual sex less compared to those not concerned about COVID-19. In the last chapter on the Netherlands, Wim van Oorschot, Erwin Gielens, and Femke Roosma (Chapter 27) study changes in the conditionality of solidarity. They show that conditionality is higher in 2008, when economic uncertainty was at its highest.

The fifth and final section involves *Values Insights from National Case Studies*, emphasizing Loek's continuous endeavour to reach out to many European countries for a detailed moral landscape of Europe. This section is initiated by two studies on Nordic Exceptionalism. First, Susanne Wallman Lundåsen (Chapter 28) focuses on the development of social trust in the Nordic countries, showing that trust increases in response to educational expansion and well-functioning governmental institutions. Second, Morten Frederiksen and Peter Gundelach (Chapter 29) zoom in on Denmark by asking whether Danish values are special. The authors review the Denmark Canon and use the EVS to inquire whether the values represented in this Canon are unique to Denmark – spoiler alert: the answer is no. We continue our European journey to the south of Europe. Penny Panagiotopoulou, Aikaterini Gari and Anastassios Emvalotis (Chapter 30) study changes between 2008 and 2019 in values related to family and marriage in Greece. Their study shows the continuous importance of the family and faithfulness in marriage among Greek respondents. In a chapter on Macedonia, Mihajlo Popovski, Antoanela Petkovska, Ilo Trajkovski and Konstantin Minoski (Chapter 31) look at gender role attitudes. The authors uncover

that variations in gender role attitudes among Macedonians reveal a gradual replacement of traditional values by more modern ones. A similar conclusion is made in Josip Baloban's contribution (Chapter 32), which concerns the transformation of values in Croatia. Combining theoretical reflections and empirical evidence, Baloban shows that Croatia is moving towards post-modernisation.

### 1.3 Some Final Remarks

This *Liber Amicorum* to honour Loek Halman's legacy at and contribution to the European Values Study also marks some transitions ongoing in the wider EVS project. One of the changes is that this 'book of friends' is being published by Open Press TiU. This edited volume is, after the *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times*, the second publication in the European Values Series that is published in an Open Access format, thereby having the potential to reach more audiences, both scholarly and outside academia, interested in European values, than ever before. In this transition to an Open Access format, we would like to thank Daan Rutten from Open Press TiU for his enthusiasm to prepare and guide us in this journey of Open Access publishing. We are also indebted to Joep Cleven in the assistance of copyediting the submitted chapters, as well to Lori Lenssinck to facilitate the design of the new European Values Series. Last but not least, we thank the European Values Study Foundation and the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University for the financial support to make this *Liber Amicorum* possible.


### List of References

- Arts, W., Hageñaars, J., & Halman, L. (2003). *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study*. Leiden: Brill.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2004). *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*. Leiden: Brill.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2014). *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe*. Leiden: Brill
- Ester, P., Halman, L., & De Moor, R. (1993). *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North America*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.

- Hageenaars, J., & Halman, L. (1989). Searching for Ideal Types: The Potentialities of Latent Class Analysis. *European Sociological Review*, 5(1), 81-96.
- Halman, L. (1991). *Waarden in de Westerse wereld. Een internationale exploratie van de waarden in de Westerse samenleving.* [*Values in the Western World: An International Exploration of Values in Western Society*] Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1996). Individualism in Individualized Society? *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 37(3-4), 196-214.
- Halman, L. (2001). *The European Values Study: A Third Wave.* Tilburg: WORC.
- Halman, L., Heunks, F., De Moor, R., & Zanders, H. (1987). *Traditie, secularisatie en individualisering. Een onderzoek naar de waarden van de Nederlanders in een Europese context.* Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., Inglehart, R., Díez-Medrano, J., Luijckx, R., Moreno, A., & Basáñez, M. (2008). *Changing Values and Beliefs in 85 countries. Trends from the Values Surveys from 1981 to 2004.* Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., Luijckx, R., & Van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European Values.* Leiden: Brill.
- Halman, L., & Riis, O. (1999). *Religion in a Secularizing Society. The European's Religion at the End of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.* Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., Reeskens, T. Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2022). *Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times.* Tilburg: Open Press TiU.
- Halman, L., & Sieben, I. (2011). *Respect man! Tolerantie, solidariteit en andere moderne waarden.* [*Respect, Man! Tolerance, Solidarity and Other Modern Values*]. Amersfoort: Celsus.
- Halman, L., Sieben, I., & Van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century.* Leiden: Brill.
- Inglehart, R., Basáñez, M., Díez-Medrano, & Halman L. (2004). *Human Beliefs and Values. A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys.* Mexico City: Siglo XXI
- Luijckx, R., Halman, L., Sieben, I., Brislinger, E., & Quandt, M. (2017). *European Values in Numbers: Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century.* Leiden: Brill.

THEORETICAL AND  
METHODOLOGICAL  
REFLECTIONS ON THE  
EUROPEAN VALUES  
STUDY

---



# 2. THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY AND GRAND THEORY:

A FRUITFUL ALLIANCE?

---

*Wil Arts*

## **Abstract**

*Within the European Values Study (EVS) a discussion has been going on for decades on the strategic question of whether it is better to use a grand theory to make sense of the findings of its cross-national surveys or whether the researchers should instead use partial or middle-range theories. This chapter attempts to make an assessment of this debate. In the 1990's several EVS-researchers opted for a rather simple and parsimonious theoretical model to explain cross-national value differences and value changes. This model they derived from modernization theory. However, after some initial success the model proved to be too simple. In the following decades it made place for a much more complex one, although modernization theory remained to be the hard core of the model. Some value researchers persevered despite half-hearted successes. Others dropped out and admitted themselves to the camp of the middle-range theories enthusiasts. This raises the additional question of what the virtues and vices of grand theories and middle-range theories are. This question too is examined in this chapter. Finally, an alternative grand theory is proposed as a possible viable alternative, cognitivist rational choice theory.*

## 2.1 Introduction

In the early days of the European Values Study (EVS), from its founding in 1978 till sometime after the first cross-national survey in 1981, its goals were highly descriptive and of an applied nature. However, pretty soon it appeared to the researchers involved that several important things were lacking. It turned out that to give direction to the choice of items to be included in the questionnaire explicit social-scientific research questions were urgently needed. What was also missing were theoretical notions that could help to interpret or even explain the empirical findings. It is on these theoretical notions that this chapter is dedicated.

In 1984, Loek Halman made an appearance in the EVS community. At first as the data analyst of the Dutch group, but soon he became the indispensable secretary of EVS' steering committee. After he finished his PhD thesis in 1990, his position within the project became increasingly a pivotal one. He was the key figure in designing the questionnaire, in keeping everybody informed, in data analyses, and in publishing books and book series. In the corridors of EVS conferences and workshops, he was affectionally called Mr. European Values. As such he had a dream: to have a grand theory that could explain all or at least most of the outcomes of the different waves of EVS. At first, his favorite grand theory, modernization theory, seemed to be rather successful. However, soon the odds turned.

Halman, however, did not want to give up his dream so easily and persevered. At this point, I have to admit my complicity. Somewhere in the second half of the 1990's, I became chair of EVS' Theory Group. He and I have several times cooperated in an endeavor to reconstruct and test more sophisticated versions of modernization theory in order to make his dream come true. Now Halman is retiring it seems to me high time to take up stock of our endeavors. Did we succeed? If not, should EVS then satisfy itself with only middle range theories? Or is there perhaps an alternative grand theory available that can successfully replace modernization theory?



## 2.2 Modernization Theory

In Halman's earliest publications (Halman et al., 1987; Halman, 1987, 1991), modernization theory already appeared on the scene. It seemed to him an ideal grand theory for EVS because it provided insights regarding the transformation of traditional societies into modern ones. Not only as far as structural changes such as industrialization and market formation and expansion are concerned, but also or particularly with regard to its effects on cultural phenomena, i.e., a tendency that traditional and religious norms and values are replaced by more secular, instrumental and individualized ones. In a chapter in Halman et al. (1987), he and his co-authors Dorenbosch and Heuks (Dorenbosch et al., 1987) reconstructed modernization theory and empirically tested hypotheses derived from it. Without mentioning Ockham's razor, they applied its law of parsimony that states that the simplest explanation is usually the right one. Their first hypothesis was apparently as a precaution formulated in probabilistic terms: 'Structural modernization will be positively correlated with cultural modernization'. However, they realized that this was a too simple hypothesis. To refine it, they used some auxiliary theories, more specifically insights from cultural lag theory and social diffusion theory. The second hypothesis stated that structural modernization is after some delay followed by cultural modernization in such a way that it starts in the industrially and technologically most advanced centre of the modernizing world and then spreads with still more delay to its less developed periphery. Both hypotheses found ample support in the macro-level analysis of the data of the 1981 wave of EVS. Nevertheless, in a chapter in the same volume Halman (1987) seemed to realize that not only the explanatory model but also the empirical test they used was a too crude one because it based itself only on central tendencies in the country samples. Therefore, he also looked at the variation at the individual level. He found that, at least in the Netherlands, individuals too could be distinguished according to their degree of modernity.

In his PhD thesis, Halman (1991) addressed the question of whether and, if so, to what degree in the Western world a compartmentalization of values had taken place. In the meantime, the survey had also been fielded in the USA and Canada. From the structural-functionalist version of modernization theory, he

derived the hypothesis that in countries in which the structural modernization of society has progressed further, people's values in the different domains are less interconnected than in countries in which the process has not gone so far yet. He tested whether this hypothesis made empirical sense. He concluded that the result was at best mixed. As expected, in advanced modern countries, religious values appeared to be less important for the values on other life domains than in less advanced ones. However, this does not mean that a country being structurally more modern implies that the interconnectedness of value domains is lower there than in less structurally modern countries. Halman also concluded that there are big differences in value preferences in the different countries. It is not a simple task to explain these cultural differences by referring only to their degree of modernization, he argued (Halman, 1991).

In 1990, a second wave of the EVS survey was fielded. Now the possibility arose to subject hypotheses not only to cross-national tests but also to longitudinal ones. The Dutch team did exactly that, they analysed the dynamics of value change between 1981 and 1990 in the West and published their results in a book (Ester et. al., 1994). Once again, the grand theory used was modernization theory. In a chapter co-authored with Ruud de Moor (Halman & de Moor, 1994), one of the questions addressed was whether the populations of modernizing societies showed a shift from traditional towards individualized values. The authors concluded that modernization did not lead to a uniform replacement of traditional values by individualized ones in all domains of social life. In an epilogue to the book, his co-author Ruud de Moor (1994), one of the founding fathers of EVS and chair of the steering committee, concluded that most hypotheses derived from modernization theory and tested in their book were not supported by the data. In his opinion, instead of grand theories, like modernization theory, empirically founded partial theories were needed. *Roma locuta causa finita*, one might assume. Exit modernization theory?

The answer is in the negative. In the 1990's, modernization theory made a remarkable comeback. Several social theorists such as Beck, Giddens and Inglehart argued that the relatively simple modernity of industrial societies had in the meantime been replaced by a different kind of modernity. This led to amendments to modernization theory. Arts and Halman (2002, 2004) used

their suggestions as a heuristic device for formulating a number of hypotheses pertaining to the supposed effect of late or post modernization on decreasing control over life, diminished interpersonal and institutional trust, and the rise of post-materialist values. Now institutionalism was used as an auxiliary theory, at least as far as the institutional arrangements of welfare regimes were concerned. We could profit not only of the data of the first two waves of EVS but also of the third wave of 2000. Post-materialism appeared not to be on the rise in the countries investigated, nor did the analyses unequivocally support the idea that differences in trust and control over life are based in differences in welfare state regimes.

In 2008, the fourth wave of EVS followed. Arts and Halman (2011, 2014) did one more attempt to save modernization theory from oblivion. The EVS-dataset now offered an opportunity to test Inglehart's various amendments to modernization theory that had led to a much more complex and sophisticated version of this grand theory (e.g., Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Inglehart suggested why there is a time lag between technological innovation and economic growth on the one hand and value changes on the other. He argued that value changes most of the time take place through intergenerational population replacement, i.e., younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the population. This is, by its very nature, a slow process. He assumed that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and remain more or less stable thereafter. He also assumed in the so-called socialization hypothesis, that people's basic values to a large extent reflect the conditions that prevailed during their pre-adult years. From these two assumptions followed that intergenerational change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations. Another assumption Inglehart made was that not only long-term developments such as technological innovation and economic growth, but also short-term changes, such as different phases of the business cycle, and short-term events, such as wars and revolutions, have an impact on people's values. This assumption is connected with the so-called scarcity hypothesis, which states that people tend to attach the greatest value to the most pressing needs of the moment. These hypotheses can be tested by looking for age, period, and cohort effects. Inglehart also argued that value patterns are

the products of not only modernization processes but also of country-specific patterns of the past, in other word, of cultural traditions. Historical value patterns are therefore interwoven with modern and post-modern ones. Thus, not only do technology and economy matter, but history does as well. Why cultural traditions are persistent, is explained by the theoretical notion of path dependence, which is the idea that cultural traditions create forces to sustain themselves even though the circumstances that gave rise to and reinforced them in the past may now no longer be relevant.

If we look at a more sophisticated version of Ockham's razor that says that explanations should be not only as simple as possible, but also as complex as necessary, we have to conclude that the simplicity of the original modernization theoretical explanation of cross-national value differences and value changes had made place for a much more complex one. The pressing question that could be asked was for us whether modernization theory was still a progressive research program or sooner had become a degenerating one. Had it not become top-heavy because of the introduction of all kinds of auxiliary assumptions and hypotheses?

In 2019, Halman wrote a state-of-the-art article that looked like his EVS swan song (Halman & Gelissen, 2019). At last, he seemed to have woken up from his beautiful dream about grand theory. The conclusion is hard and straightforward. Modernization theory falls short when it comes to explaining the often considerable differences in value orientations between populations in various countries. There is more needed than economic growth and technological innovations to explain these differences. Institutions, culture, history, policies, all appear to affect people's values. Nevertheless, context is not enough. It is essential to include individual-level characteristics, at least as controls. Quite often, individual attributes appear differently distributed in different countries, which may be the main reason why differences in value orientations between countries remain. Multi-level analysis is the appropriate tool for separating such composition effects from true contextual effects and multi-level theories are needed to explain what is going on with regard to cross-country value differences and value changes.

## 2.3 Middle-Range Theories

When Ruud de Moor (1994) concluded that modernization theory was far too general to explain the findings of EVS, he avoided the term middle-range theories. Why this was the case is not entirely clear. Perhaps to prevent that he would get bogged down in a long, drawn-out debate in sociology about the concept of theory. The discussion about grand versus middle-range theory started at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1947 dedicated to a stocktaking of the discipline. As chairman of the section on theory, Talcott Parsons delivered a paper on *The Position of Sociological Theory* and Robert Merton was his discussant. These papers were published in the next year (Parsons, 1948; Merton, 1948). Parsons returned to this discussion in his presidential address on *The Prospects of Sociological Theory* to the annual meeting of the same society in 1949 and in the meantime Merton (1949) had elaborated on his short discussion paper. Parsons' address was published in the following year (Parsons, 1950). He argued that we need theory among other things to make in empirical research a selection among the enormous number of possible variables. Whereas Parsons emphasized the importance of high levels of generality in constructing sociological theories, Merton defended theories of the middle range: theories that lie between working hypotheses and a unified theory that tries to explain all the observed uniformities of social life. Twenty years later, Merton (1968) looked back at how the discussion proceeded. He noted that the responses to his plea were polarized. Many empirical sociologists gave assent to a middle-range theoretical strategy because this was what they already practiced. Many theorists, however, found it a retreat from properly high aspirations. The third response was a combination of the two others. An emphasis on middle-range theories does not mean exclusive attention to this kind of theorizing. Instead, it sees the development of more comprehensive theory as coming about through consolidations of middle-range theories rather than emerging, all at once, from the work of individual theorists on the grand scale.

If we look at the many publications generated by EVS and its daughter, the World Values Survey, it becomes clear that the overwhelming majority of them falls within the limits of the second and third response noticed by Merton.

Loek Halman and I belonged to the few who persevered and tried for a long time to save grand theory within EVS from oblivion following the methodological guideline that one must treat budding theoretical research programs leniently. It may take decades before they get off the ground and become empirically progressive. However, later on, we gave up and resigned in our defeat (Arts, 2011; Halman & Gelissen, 2019).

## **2.4 Cognitivist Rational Choice Theory**

One could wonder whether this was too soon. To answer this question, we should perhaps look at the work of Raymond Boudon. Looking back at the debate about grand theory versus middle-range theories, Boudon (1991) concluded that what sociologists mean by the term ‘theory’ is not always clear. On the one hand you have ‘broad theory’ that tries to determine the overarching independent variable that would operate in all social processes, or to determine the essential feature of social structure, or to find out the two, three, or four concepts that would be sufficient to analyze all social phenomena. This is according to the advocates of middle-range theory a hopeless and even quixotic enterprise. On the other hand, you have sociologists who defend middle-range theories. This does not refer to a specific kind of theory, but is rather an approach to theory construction. Sociological theories, like all scientific theories, should aim to consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and empirical regularities. They should help explain puzzling phenomena and create new solid knowledge about the aspects of the world it is traditionally concerned with. One could argue that modernization theory is a mixed form of both types of sociological theory, partly bad partly good theorizing.

More important, however, is that Boudon refers positively to a middle-range theory that he himself developed and which he originally called subjective rationality theory and later cognitivist rational choice theory (Boudon, 1989, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2009). He elaborated this theory choosing the notion of subjective or bounded rationality that Herbert Simon coined, as a starting point. In simple situations, individuals often act according to what rational choice theory predicts: they maximize utility. Confronted with ambiguous and com-

plex situations, they, however, appeal to theoretical notions, heuristic devices and moral principles to master these situations. Rational choice theory is therefore a powerful theory when applied to some types of social phenomena, but it appears to be powerless when confronted with many other types. Boudon identified three of these latter types: 1) All human actions are dictated by descriptive or cognitive beliefs. Sometimes they are commonplace and need no further attention, but some other times they are non-commonplace. Then it is crucial to investigate and evaluate the beliefs upon which they rest to explain the actions involved. 2) Some human actions are based on non-consequential prescriptive or moral beliefs. These actions are not intended to generate some outcome, but to endorse a moral principle. 3) Some other actions cannot in any sensible way assume to be dictated by self-interest. Sociologists often find themselves confronted with this latter kind of phenomenon, since social actors are regularly called upon to evaluate situations in which they are not personally implicated.

Boudon (1995, 1999, 2001) published around the turn of the millennium several books in which he dealt with especially the second type of phenomena. He gave a general overview of philosophical and sociological theories concerned with the sense of values that people have and their origin. He made a distinction between culturalist theories on the one hand and naturalist ones on the other. The first group considers values as cultural features that are endorsed or rejected by people because they have been socialized to them. The second group assumes that our moral principles are innate, i.e., derived from human nature. Both groups of theories can and have been rightly criticized. The first group cannot explain why there are some values that nearly everybody seems to share and the second one cannot explain the variability of values over time and space. Boudon's objective was to defend and illustrate that the universal and contextual sides of values cannot be theorized independently from one another and returned to his cognitivist rational choice theory. He started from Weber's distinction between instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) and non-instrumental or axiological rationality (*Wertrationalität*). People do not so much endorse values because of considerations of self-interest, but sooner because they have strong reasons why they accept some values and not others. When individuals think that 'x is good', they have good reasons for thinking so

and they think so because of these reasons. Nevertheless, strong reasons here and now are not necessarily strong reasons there and then. A strong system of reasons can become weak and the other way round. Therefore, Boudon's theory is both contextual and historical.

The pivotal orienting statement at the core of Boudon's theory goes as follows: If individuals subscribe to a value statement, then they have most of the time good, or strong, or acceptable reasons for believing in it. Reasons can therefore be seen as causes. There, however, are not only rational causes of an axiological or instrumental nature, but also irrational ones such as emotions and traditions. Explanations with irrational forces can be often legitimately replaced by explanations with reasons. Opp (2014) has argued that Boudon's theory is strikingly simple and has the advantage that it contributes to the explanation of both micro and macro phenomena and that it is testable. According to him, there, however, are also disadvantages, such as that the explanatory power is very low. A selection or relevance criterion for the kind of reasons and irrational factors that are causes for the explananda is lacking. Another disadvantage Opp (2014) sees is that the empirical validity is questionable. The theory not only proposes to explain why people subscribe to normative beliefs, but also to descriptive beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and behavior. Is it possible to explain the wide range of phenomena that Boudon's cognitive rational choice theory tries to explain with a single theory? For proponents of grand theory, the answer is in the affirmative. Perhaps this is the overarching theoretical system people such as Loek Halman have dreamt of, although proponents of middle-range theories will be skeptical towards the validity of such a claim.

## **2.5 Concluding Remarks**

Forty years ago, the first cross-national EVS-survey was fielded. Four more waves followed with an interval of nine years. Surprisingly enough, it turns out that after so long a lapse of time it is still not so easy to give an unambiguous answer to the question of whether the alliance between EVS and grand theory has been a fruitful one. Modernization theory, once the favourite grand theory within EVS, could not pass the empirical tests satisfactorily in spite of ever



more complex sophisticated versions. These more complex and sophisticated versions did, however, lead to much more sophisticated data analyses. Although Loek and I (Arts, 2011; Halman & Gelissen, 2019) gave up on developing and testing new versions of modernization theory, others did not. Ronald Inglehart (2018), for example, recently presented the first full statement of his evolutionary modernization theory and the empirical findings that it generated.

In the meantime, the majority of EVS-researchers heeded de Moor's call and decided to restrict themselves to use middle-range theories to explain and test more specific phenomena. They realized that not only modernization matters, but that history, culture, institutions and so on and so forth also do. Loek Halman did not only dream, but he also accomplished a lot by co-editing a great number of books in which their papers have been published.

So far so good, but the question remains whether there is an alternative grand theory available that can successfully replace modernization theory. The answer is yes. Boudon's cognitivist rational choice theory could come handy in this respect, because it is based on methodological individualism, which means that the theory is supposed to contribute to the explanation of both micro and macro social phenomena. De Graaf (2008) drew our attention to this theory in his inaugural lecture. Following his lead, we (Arts & Halman, 2014) avowed that EVS researchers should put much more attention to values that nearly all Europeans seem to share instead of only focusing on differences within and between European countries in this respect. It seems worthwhile to give Boudon's theory more attention within EVS, although I realize that neither Halman nor I will be the ones that will accomplish this feat. It is up to a new generation of EVS researchers. Nevertheless, they could profit from the work of several sociologists who have criticized and tried to elaborate on Boudon's theory such as Hamlin (2004) and Opp (2014).

## List of References

- Arts, W.A. (2011). Explaining European value patterns: Problems and solutions. *Studia UBB Sociologia*, 56, 7-31.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2002). Risk and trust. Value change in the second age of modernity. In P. Chiemelski, T. Krause, & W. Wesolowski (Eds.), *Kultura, Osobowość, Polityka* (pp. 321-348). Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.
- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (2004). European value changes in the second age of modernity. W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.) In *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium* (pp. 25-53). Brill.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2011). Value research and transformation in Europe. In R. Polak (Ed.), *Zukunft. Werte. Europa. Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990-2010: Österreich im Vergleich*. (pp. 79-99). Böhlau.
- Arts, W., & L. Halman. (2014). Cross-national values in Europe today: Facts and explanations. In W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds.), *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe. Painting Europe's moral landscapes* (pp. 1-17). Brill.
- Boudon, R. (1989). Subjective rationality and the explanation of social behavior. *Rationality and Society*, 1, 173-196.
- Boudon, R. (1991). What middle-range theories are. *Contemporary Sociology*, 20, 519-522.
- Boudon, R. (1995). *Le juste et le vrai*. Fayard/Seuil.
- Boudon, R. (1996). The cognitivist model: A generalized 'rational choice model'. *Rationality and Society*, 8, 123-150.
- Boudon, R. (1998). Limitations of rational choice theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104, 817-828.
- Boudon, R. (1999). *Le sens des valeurs*. Presses Universitaires de France.
- Boudon, R. (2001). *The Origins of Values. Philosophy and Sociology of Beliefs*. Transaction Publishers.
- Boudon, R. (2003). Beyond rational choice theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 1-21.
- Boudon, R. (2009). Rational choice theory. In B.S. Turner (Ed.), *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (pp. 179-195). Wiley-Blackwell.
- Dorenbos, J., Halman, L., & Heunks, F., (1987). Modernising in West-Europa: Een tweedeling? In L. Halman, F. Heunks, R. de Moor, & H. Zanders, *Traditie, Secularisatie en Individualisering* (pp. 234-254). Tilburg University Press.
- Graaf, P. de. (2008). *Waarden die ertoe doen: De European Values Study in de 21<sup>ste</sup> eeuw*. Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1987). Op zoek naar typen in de Nederlandse cultuur. In Halman, L., Heunks, F., de Moor R. & Zanders, H. (1987). *Traditie, Secularisatie en Individualisering* (pp. 220-233). Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L. (1991). *Waarden in de Westerse Wereld*. Tilburg University Press.

- Halman, L. & de Moor, R. (1994). Value patterns and modernity. In Ester, P., Halman L., & de Moor, R. (Eds.), *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North-America* (pp. 155-161). Tilburg University Press.
- Halman, L., & Gelissen, J. (2019). Values in life domains in a cross-national perspective. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 71 (Suppl. 1), 519-543.
- Hamlin, D. (2004). *Beyond Relativism. Raymond Boudon, cognitive rationality and critical realism*. Routledge.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2018). *Cultural Evolution. People's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. (2000). Modernization, cultural change and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review* 65, 19-51.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Merton, R.K. (1947). Discussion of Parsons' 'The position of sociological theory'. *American Sociological Review*, 13, 164-168.
- Merton, R.K. (1949). On sociological theories of the middle range. In Merton R.K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (pp. 448-459). Simon & Schuster-Free Press.
- Merton, R.K. (1968). On sociological theories of the middle range. In R.K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Enlarged edition, (pp. 39-72). Free Press.
- Moor, R. de. (1994). Epilogue. In Ester, P., Halman L., & de Moor R. (Eds.), *The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North-America*. Tilburg University Press.
- Opp, K-D. (2014). The explanation of everything. A critical assessment of Raymond Boudon's theory explaining descriptive and normative beliefs, attitudes, preferences and behavior. *Revista de Sociologia*, 99, 481-514.
- Parsons, T. (1947). The position of sociological theory. *American Sociological Review*, 13, 156-171.
- Parsons, T. (1949). The prospects of sociological theory. *American Sociological Review*, 15, 3-16.

# 3. CONFLICTS OF EUROPEAN VALUES IN TIMES OF TURBULENCE

.....

*Georgy Fotev*

## **Abstract**

*The values that function in today's Europe have a twofold genealogy: a) fundamental values whose homeland is Europe; b) values imported from other cultures and civilizations. Heterogeneous values always give rise to latent or manifested tensions and conflicts, but they are the basis of European prosperity. Europe has been going through unprecedented turbulence for the last 3-4 decades. In such a context, there are sharp conflicts of values and it is difficult to strike a balance between unity and diversity. Social transformations are conditioned by a revaluation of values. Values perceived as positive are considered as a result of changes in negative (depreciated). Value reorientations are registered by EVS's longitudinal data regarding family and marriage, in relation to new forms of family life (unmarried family), in relation to national and ethnic identity, relations between religious denominations, etc. Waves of immigrants test fundamental European values. The growing complexity raises tensions between the principles of democracy and the new meritocracy. In periods of turbulence, the need for knowledge about the real functioning values and the conflicts between them is exacerbated. EVS gives a positive answer to this need. People see what they know and it is crucial what and how they see the changing world.*

### 3.1 European Values as Ambiguous in Terms of Their Genealogy

The term 'European values' is ambiguous in terms of their genealogy. One meaning refers to the values that define European civilization, European culture, the spiritual form of Europe. The homeland (genealogy) of these values is Europe. The other meaning refers to values *functioning* in modern Europe, including values transferred through migration from other civilizations and cultures (genealogy). Some European values in the substantial sense of the term have become universal. The universalization of European values has always and in many places met with resistance, and today in many parts of the world there is fierce resistance. In general, the same cannot be said of the transfer of values from outside Europe. Europe's openness to others is determined by a number of factors, among which such fundamental European values as tolerance, pluralism, democracy, multiculturalism that are of key importance.

Taken in themselves, values in general, like numbers, are imaginary and a priori. From the point of view of the philosophy of values, there are positive and negative values: good-evil, beautiful-ugly, etc. The values functioning in society, studied by empirical sciences such as sociology, are positive or negative depending on their perception. For example, after the implosion of the totalitarian-communist system in Bulgaria, the values previously considered positive are considered negative. This is the case with every crisis of values and their reevaluation (Fotev 1999a; Fotev 1999b; Fotev, 2012). Empirical sciences such as sociology take values as a prerequisite or a given issues that philosophy and especially axiology deal with. An empirical science of values does not provide answers to philosophical questions and does not solve such problems, just as philosophical axiology is dangerous and harmful when it enters the value field of empirical science.

The philosophy of values has a long and fruitful tradition in Europe, but this is not the case with the empirical study of the values functioning in European societies. EVS is an unprecedented project. The success of this project is due to the fruitful collaboration of researchers from all European countries involved in EVS. Everyone is grateful to the distinguished scholar and researcher, our

dear friend Loek Halman, who has dedicated several decades to EVS. His name is well known and respected among academics in my country.

The theory (theoretical model) of values for the empirical study is of paramount importance. Empirical social science in its theoretical part is in dialogue with philosophy. Inevitably, two different perspectives intersect. The present analysis and in-depth interpretation of EVS data on conflicts of values implies the necessary intersection of the two disparate perspectives.

There are different heterogeneous value spheres, which are in an irreconcilable struggle with each other. “And we know that something can be beautiful not just although it is not good but even in the very aspect that lacks goodness” (Weber 2004: 22). Values are self-founded, as are the gods. “These goods and their struggles are ruled over by fate, and certainly not by ‘science’” (Weber 2004: 23). The heterogeneous spheres of values and their conflicts, which are latent and manifested, are dominated by fate, not by one science or another. But if values are not chosen by people, they are fictions, and in that sense neither destiny nor science has anything to do with them. However, when a value is chosen and functions in the life world of people, in society, it determines the real social actions (individual or collective). People of flesh and blood, individual members of society, groups, communities and nations make valuable choices in every social action. The choice is a conscious or unconscious conflict or tension between values. The big problem is managing conflicts and tensions between values.

The in-depth interpretation of the empirical data on conflicts between values functioning in the European society is revealing the context of the registered differentiated value choice of the respondents, representing the general aggregates of the separate studied European societies. It is a question of *the boundaries of context* and, in this sense, of *the depth of interpretation*. In principle, depth is bottomless, and therefore interpretation as illuminating the context has a rational limitation. Beyond our borders is destiny. And from the inner side of the border are the possibilities of managing tensions and conflicts between heterogeneous values.

### 3.2 The Difficult Balance Between Unity and Diversity

EVS embraces the values that function in European society. The concept of European society has cognitive legitimacy because national societies within Europe's geographical borders are not closed but open to each other, and within the European Union there is even greater reason to talk about *European society*. The field of EVS are differentiated national societies, which provides opportunities for comparative research of data from each wave, as well as in longitudinal terms. This format of the study includes value tensions and conflicts in the different societies between the main European positive and negative values regarding the integration and diversification in the European society.

European integration is fundamentally a value issue, but not just concerning values. At the heart of the complex question is whether integration is identified with *homogenization* or whether integration is based on *cultural diversity*, preservation and strengthening of the value identity of national societies, traditions and autopoiesis. These two views and policies, respectively, are two different orders of values. Europe is divided into several regions, which differ typologically in their appearance as European countries with specific characteristics and features, incl. of value order (Dyson, Sepos 2012: 83 ff; 215 ff). Europe's cultural unity and diversity is multidimensional and historically determined. "To gain insight into the unity of European cultural diversity and the diversity of European unity we need to attain a good understanding of the complex history of shifting fault lines. Such an understanding is also crucial for understanding the results of the European Values Study surveys (...). The most obvious dividing line is the one that separates Western Europe from Eastern Europe, with a wide transitional zone, sometimes called Central Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans. Yet one has to insist that the West-East division has never been fixed or permanent. Probably the most durable is the line between Catholic (Latin) Christianity and Orthodox (Greek) Christianity" (Arts, Hagenaars, Halman 2003: 81). Diversity without tolerance, pluralism and other related fundamental values is becoming a source of constant latent or manifested value tensions and conflicts, as are well known in Europe. "The division of Europe into two opposing halves, therefore, is not



entirely fanciful. It rides, however, roughshod over many other lines of division of equal importance. It ignores serious differences both within the West and within the East and it ignores the strong historic division between North and South” (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman 2003: 81). The quoted book also points out the divisions related to the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism. “Taking the full range of factors into consideration one can only conclude that to see Europe’s cultural fault lines one should not divide Europe into two regions, but at least into four or five overlapping ones. Despite their differences all the regions of Europe still hold a great deal in common. (...) Despite their own antagonisms, they share fears and anxieties about influences from outside – whether from America, from Africa, or from Asia. Fundamental unity is no less obvious than manifest diversity” (Arts, Hagedaars, Halman. 2003: 82). Different pictures of European values are possible, some of which are sustainable and others much more volatile. The disturbed balance between unity and diversity creates turbulence. The metaphor of turbulence is in many cases closer to what Schumpeter calls *creative destruction*. Unlike a crisis in turbulence, when a crisis is not included, it is clear from the beginning what values a part of society is focused on and there is no search for a way out of the chaos (crisis), which is typical for the crisis.

### **3.3 Driving Forces of Values’ Tensions**

Every significant social change (transformation) is value-conditioned and leads to a change in the constellation of values functioning in European society. The five waves of EVS register the connection between values and social change. When changes are large-scale and radical or epochal, value problems become visible to all, as a war rages between heterogeneous values, there are clashes between forces which are for a reassessment of values and those that are for the status quo. Particular to society, which is for the established order of values, sees the revaluation as the destruction of the values and foundations of society. Such a radical and, in a sense, unprecedented transformation was the implosion of the totalitarian-communist system and the transition of the former communist countries to democracy and a market economy. *The implosion of the totalitarian-communist system* is an unprecedented event. Radical social

change can always be the result of an explosion (wars, including civil wars, bloodshed, violence, etc.) rather than a “Velvet Revolution”. The time has come for a dramatic reassessment of values. The totalitarian-communist system is falling apart and its values are considered negative (Fotev 2009b: 1115). Wars of values are the result of social and existential turbulence and generate turbulence. Europe and the world are nowadays in turbulence and seem to be in a crisis of values. The issue that concerns all Europeans is the next Europe.

European society has a central place and importance for globalization, which has certain values as driving forces, but globalization itself has no final values and goals, which gives an answer to the related value disorder. *Globalization* is fuelling sharp conflicts of values, and the end of this war seems hopeless. “The new world in which we now live is giving many citizens much to fear, including the uprooting of many previously stable sources of identity and security. Where change is most rapid, widening disparities in the distribution of income are a key concern. It is indeed an age of turbulence, and it would be imprudent and immoral to minimize the human cost of its disruptions” (Greenspan, 2007:18). In the context of globalization, every order of values is shaken to its foundations and there is a disorder or feverish rearrangement of values, which naturally passes through conflicts between values. Globalization means an enormous intensification of international contacts and this also evokes resistance. As a reflex against globalization, people turn to their own familiar culture and values. The threat that globalization gives rise to mobilizes the protection of and desire for one’s own culture, traditions, rites and way of life. Regretfully, it also results in opposition to immigrants and foreigners. This trend of anti-globalisation is very strong; I think that if you assess the European values today, you will witness the inclination towards tradition clearly. People have become more traditional, more conservative“ (Arts, Hageaars, Halman. 2003: 61). When an in-depth interpretation of individual EVS data sets is performed, the meanings in relation to the global context take place.

Aren’t the global media fundamentally changing a new self-determination of man’s place in the world? Norris and Inglehart (2009) shed a lot of light on these multidimensional and contradictory processes: by analysing and interpreting data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS).

The fourth industrial revolution, also called *the digital revolution*, transformed European society and gave rise to *a new constellation of European values*. „People living in contemporary European society are not only believed to be more autonomous and free to decide for themselves, they are also assumed to experience a wide variety of influences from other parts of the world“ (Arts, Hagenaaars, Halman. 2003: 378). *Social reality becomes dualistic* as virtual or online social reality occupies most of the time budget and in many cases almost all the waking time of the day for large groups of society, for a huge number of professions. EVS covers the real social world, the reality offline. In the future, it is necessary to take into account the online social world, as well as the interactions of social workers with intelligent machines and non-humans.

*The family* is not a basic cell of society, as Auguste Comte believed, but it is the center of the most sensitive aspects of human life. Basic values of the family undergo a radical reassessment. Accepted as socially valid, enshrined in moral norms *positive values become negative*, and considered negative values are tacitly or openly *accepted as positive*. In addition to data from the third and fifth waves of EVS, one in five Europeans considers marriage to be an outdated institution. Of course, there are differences in the shares across countries, such as in some countries, which consider marriage as a residual institution between 20% and 30%, for others between 30% and 40%, which are not complete pictures, as indicated and often considered in different countries (Halman 2001:129; EVS, GESIS (2020). „The claim that the concept of a normal family has become redundant is not to say that heterosexual, parent-child families with traditional gender roles have vanished. Rather, it is claimed that this particular family type now co-exists with a diverse range of living arrangements. This diversification of lifestyles and values means that perceptions of what is ‘normal’ are becoming relativized“ (Ester, Braun, Mohle 2006: 61). Since each norm is a socially required value, the refusal to accept a norm as socially valid is a matter of revaluation of value.

*Growing complexity* is a characteristic trend of late modern European society. The European of any nationality, ethnicity, religion, social status, is involved in more and more *anonymous relations*, which calls into question the traditional grounds of trust as a fundamental social value. In total, more than 40% of Europeans, according to the Fifth Wave of EVS, which covers 37 countries, trust