JIHADISM, SECTARIANISM AND POLITICS IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

Adib Abdulmajid

Eburon

Utrecht 2021

ISBN 978-94-6301-344-4 (paperback)

ISBN 978-94-6301-354-3 (ebook)

Eburon Academic Publishers, Utrecht, The Netherlands

www.eburon.nl

Cover design: Textcetera, The Hague

Graphic design: Studio Iris, Leende

© 2021 A. Abdulmajid. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietor.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has encountered multiple challenges over the recent years, including armed conflicts and political rivalries, that are believed to hold serious consequences for the region’s future landscape on political, social and economic levels. Sectarianism seems to have played a main role in the mounting rivalries and confrontations between key players in the Middle East, coupled with the formation of variable alliances in response to the surrounding developments. Meanwhile, the rise of various Islamist organizations across crisis-afflicted parts of the region raised questions about Jihadism-related doctrinal tenets to which such organizations claim attachment. Above all, the potentially devastating consequences of such developments on the populations inhabiting the region increase the interest in gaining a better understanding of the origins of the multifaceted crisis storming the region.

The cultural diversity that once enriched the Middle East on various levels, and the historic coexistence among the region’s different communities, have been threatened and jeopardized by a few sectarian extremist groups whose atrocities reached every single social component with distinct religious, doctrinal or ideological tenets. Ethnic and religious minorities have become a target to radical groups, and sedition has been ignited and reinforced by the extremist discourse of sectarian organizations in the region, amid considerable failures by political leaderships.

Sectarianism forms one of the major challenges facing the Middle East, frequently arising in debates about geopolitical rifts and tensions throughout the region. Given the fact that the sectarian narrative has become one of the main features of the crises that continue to beset the region, delving into the notion of sectarianism, its evolution throughout the history of the region, and the associated conceptions, interpretations and developments, appears inescapable if one tries to understand the background of the contemporary Middle Eastern landscape.

Furthermore, the rise of Islamic militancy over the past few decades and the alleged attachment of various extremist groups to Islamic jihad (jihād Islāmī) have paved the way for a widespread controversy about the actual relationship between jihād, as a concept, and Jihadism, as a movement characterized by a radical worldview. Hence, exploring the origins of jihād in the Islamic tradition, the various interpretations of this notion and its eventual employment by Islamist extremists as a doctrinal basis to justify their actions, seems crucial.

In order to rise and establish itself, extremism undoubtedly requires a fertile ground. As two of the major hotspots of the Middle East, Iraq and Syria emerged in the first two decades of the 21st century as main incubators to extremist Islamist groups in the region. In the aftermath of the 2003 war, Iraq suffered from a widespread chaos and security vacuum, coupled with intensifying sectarian rifts, which erupted at a governmental level and later reached the very core of the society. These were key factors that led to the rise of sectarian Shia militias such as al-Hashd al-Shaabi and the radical Sunni ISIS group. Meanwhile, as the Syrian uprising of 2011 descended into a civil war, extremist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS found a sufficient foothold and joined the conflict under the pretext of protecting fellow Muslims. The rise of religious extremism considerably deprived the people of the region of their legitimate aspirations in establishing a pluralistic form of government based on democratic principles and willing to demonstrate respect to basic human rights. Thus, this anti-tyranny revolutionary age has been largely infiltrated and hijacked by some radical movements that tirelessly sought to forcibly impose their extremist agenda on exhausted populations, particularly in war-ravaged areas.

The emergence and growth of sectarian Islamist militant organizations such as Sunni-based al-Qaeda and ISIS, and Shia-guided al-Hashd al-Shaabi, whose leaders have constantly emphasized their commitment to an extremist version of jihād, can be seen as a fruit of the emerging radical theorizations, interpretations and elucidations on the conception of jihād, which have continued to flow and unfold throughout the 20th century, and the evolution of the movement of Islamism in general. The tactics, targets and arenas of operation pursued by such groups in the recent years indicate the dramatic evolution of the movement of Jihadism. Such a development constitutes an unprecedented transformation of the basic idea of jihād into a radical concept upon which some of the most fanatic and atrocious organizations are based in terms of thought, ideology, discourse and course of action. Besides, globalization and the digital age surface at the heart of the propaganda and recruitment campaigns launched by such radical groups to attract as many members and sympathizers to their alleged cause as possible, and jihād has been hereby exploited as a brand to provide a religious legitimacy to their cause and emotionally manipulate the recipients of their increasingly ideological discourse.

In order to understand the emergence of the contemporary political landscape in the Middle East and the developments attached to it, beside the rise of Jihadism and sectarianism as major challenges, shedding light on the modern history of the region seems vital in terms of studying, understanding and analyzing the multifaceted topic at hand.

This book tackles questions of core significance for the comprehension of the current religio-political scenery in the Middle East, the doctrinal tenets associated with the emergence of influential Islamist organizations, the ultimate rise of sectarian-based extremist groups, and the challenges encountered by the culturally-diverse populations amid such developments. It provides the reader with a study of sectarianism, Islamism, Salafism and Jihadism. It also delves into the historical events that have shaped the Middle East as we know it today. It further explores the key factors behind the rise of the most influential extremist sectarian-guided, jihādi-based groups in the recent years.

The main objective of this book is to help the reader understand the complex religio-political scene in today’s Middle East and the ideological tenets of key influential movements whose beliefs and actions ultimately jeopardize the cultural diversity in the region. This is accomplished through a comprehensive literature-based study and analysis of the various aspects associated with sectarianism, Islamism, Salafism and jihadism, the multifaceted context within which these concepts and currents evolved, and their eventual impact on the political landscape and the society at large. This book also strives to thoroughly identify and analyze the main factors behind the rise and expansion of sectarian-guided extremist Islamist organizations and the associated threat to the cultural diversity in crisis-stricken parts of the region, particularly Syria and Iraq.

This book comprises five parts. Part I primarily focuses on the concept of sectarianism, sheds light on the emergence and development of sectarianism in the Islamic history, and further delves into the cultural diversity in the Middle East and the threats encountering this melting-pot. Part II explores the multifaceted notion of jihād, the various interpretations of the concept, the rise of Salafi-Jihadism and the eventual employment of Islamic jihād by militants. Part III investigates the emergence and development of the movements of Islamism and Salafism. Part IV looks into the historical events that have contributed to the rise of the modern Middle East, including the emergence of national borders, the Western influence, the state of turmoil across post-independence states, the aspirations associated with recent revolutionary movements and the challenges accompanying the Islamization of popular uprisings. Part V thoroughly scrutinizes the politico-sectarian roots of contemporary Islamist extremism.

Part I

SECTARIANISM

Sectarianism constitutes one of the significant challenges encountering the Middle East. The concept emerges frequently in debates about the geopolitical tensions and rivalries among major powers and key players in the region. It arises at the core of the crises that hit various parts of the Middle East over the recent years. While the roots of the sectarian divide, as tackled in the context of this volume, originate in the early history of Islam, its manifestations have taken various forms and continue to re-emerge as one of the defining dimensions of the political rifts and armed conflicts that persist to afflict the region today. Given the fact that the sectarian narrative has become a defining feature of major crises striking the Middle East, it seems crucial to tackle the notion of sectarianism, its evolution throughout the history of the region, and the associated conceptions, interpretations and developments.

2.   SECTARIANISM: CONCEPT AND CHARACTERISTICS

In discussions about the Middle East and regional rifts and conflicts such as the case of Syria and Iraq, the term sectarianism (al-Ṭā’ifiyya) is frequently mentioned, often without a sufficient explanation or a sharp definition.¹ Although the concept of sectarianism remains largely undertheorized, several definitions of the term and explanations of its characteristics have been produced over the years.² Sectarianism is defined by Liechty and Clegg as a system of “attitudes, actions, beliefs and structures, which arises as a distorted expression of positive, human needs especially for belonging, identity and the free expression of difference and is expressed in destructive patters of relating.”³ It is believed to function at personal, communal and institutional levels, constantly involving a religious element as well as a negative mixture of politics and religion.⁴ According to Brewer, sectarianism can be considered as “the determination of actions, attitudes and practices by practices about religious difference, which results in them invoked as the boundary marker to represent social stratification and conflict.”⁵ The term thus refers to a bunch of beliefs, ideas and myths about religious difference mainly used to turn religion into a social marker and make disdainful comments and statements about other groups. In tensions between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims, or between one religious group and another like between Muslims and Christians, each group tends to identify itself with the religious and political features displayed in the discourse of its leadership, separating it from other communities in the area they inhabit and leading to some discriminatory statements about the alleged ‘other’. Sectarianism is further deemed to be a set of prejudiced attitudes, policies and types of treatment based on religious difference, occurring at the levels of ideas, individual action and social structure.⁶ In its modern context, sectarianism implies reference to the deployment of religious heritage as a key marker of modern political identity. It is ultimately “an act of interpretation that shapes as well as is shaped by religious mobilizations and violence in the modern world.”⁷ Sectarianism is described by Makdisi in his The Culture of Sectarianism as “a disease that prevents modernization.”⁸

The academic discussion around the notion of sectarianism in the recent years has been increasingly driven by the rise and development of intra-religious strife, whether within Islam, Christianity or Judaism, leading many scholars to study and explore the nature and origins of sectarian rifts and struggle. One of the key aspects of sectarianism is the growth of in-group sentiments and an extreme attachment to a certain set of values and beliefs that emerge in contrast with that of other groups within the same society. Despite the various disagreements within the scholarly discussion of sectarianism, there is a relevant degree of agreement on what defines belongingness to a particular sect, which implicates “being a member of a group that has a shared identity, belief or ideology that defines them from the rest of the society.”⁹ While the term is basically employed in the context of discussing differences among religious communities with negative connotations involved, the concept of sectarianism has further expanded to include political as well as ethnic minorities. In order to understand the fundamental dynamics of sectarianism, it is of great importance to consider Ibn Khaldun’s idea of ʿaṣabiyya or group feeling, which entails a process of developing group relations and ties as a key factor for empowering a community and ensuring the survival of its identity and basic values against any outside danger.¹⁰ Hence, attributing negative connotations to the perceived “others” and subsequently excluding other groups for not sharing similar values, beliefs and ideological tenets emerge at the core of the notion of sectarianism. Its discriminative nature often leads to social divide that may eventually manifest itself in the form of violent strife aimed at the survival and prevalence of one’s own sectarian identity over others.

Although the term is basically used in reference to animosity, grudge and prejudice toward individuals or groups with different beliefs, sectarianism also holds a political dimension. Mabon and Royle strongly disagree with the narrative that suggests that sectarianism is inherently violent, arguing that violence only occurs when the sectarian differences or identities are politicized.¹¹ The notion of sectarianism is widely used in describing a country’s social and political divisions with religious implications involved. The Middle East has witnessed numerous of such examples. Saudi Arabia, the major Sunni power in the region, has repeatedly witnessed suppression of predominantly-Shia movements in the Kingdom, where the authorities accused Iran, the major Shia power in the Middle East, of supporting such movements to destabilize the region. In Syria, rebel groups fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising were mainly characterized by their Sunni-based struggle, striving to overthrow the Alawites from power. In Iraq and Bahrain, tensions and struggle for power are mainly based on the deep Sunni-Shia cleavage. Another example of the political dimension of the concept of sectarianism is Lebanon, where the political system is formally based on the distribution of power between Maronite Christians, Shia and Sunni Muslims. In this context, competitive or hostile political relationships between communities defined by their religious characteristics and traits are expressed through a sectarian discourse. This basically applies to tensions and conflicts between groups adhering to a broad faith community such as Muslims, where widespread disputes and clashes between Sunni and Shia have been taking place, similar to tensions between Protestants and Catholics in Europe, and also between completely different faiths like between Muslims and Christians.¹² Hence, a religious identity is employed as a marker of difference among diverse communities, leading to rifts and tensions over power and political matters, where questions of marginalization, discrimination and exclusion on the basis of religious affiliation are raised. Illustrative cases are to be found in different parts of the Middle East, taking various forms and bearing multiple consequences. As a minority religious group in northern Iraq, the Yezidi Kurds were exposed to socioeconomic marginalization by Sunni Kurds in the Kurdistan Region. This led many Yezidis to deny the ethnic and cultural ties they share with the Kurds and claim to constitute a unique ethnoreligious community with own history, culture, religious customs and traditions. Under Saddam Hussein, the Shia suffered exclusion and suppression by the Sunni-led regime, and in post-2003 Iraq the situation reversed as the Shia took power and pursued oppressive and exclusionary policies against the Sunnis. In Syria, the Alawite regime of Assad excluded Sunnis from power circles for decades. The Lebanese suffered over fifteen years from a sectarian-based civil war that exhausted the country and devastated its people.

3.   EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTARIANISM IN THE ISLAMIC HISTORY

In the Islamic world, sectarianism has for long played a defining role with regard to key rifts and differences that have emerged and surfaced within the Muslim society over centuries in the aftermath of the major Sunni-Shia split. Issues of rightful religious authority and eligible political leadership arise at the heart of intra-Islamic sectarianism. In the early history of Islam, strong disagreements erupted between the Islamic elite regarding grave issues affecting the ’umma. One of the most bitter and definitely the longest lasting issues was the rift that occurred over the political succession to the Prophet Muhammad. A Sunni-Shia split emerged as a consequence of the different claims to the leadership of political Islam. Other political disputes occurred between those who had been the earliest converts and companions of the Prophet (Ṣaḥāba) and those who had joined Islam much later on, mainly the elders of the Quraysh tribe. These disagreements threatened to tear apart the community.¹³

Subsequent to the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D., a split within the Muslim community took place, mainly due to political disagreements. Two major branches of Islam emerged, the largest of which was the Sunni, the followers of Sunna or tradition and known as ’Ahl al-Sunna or the People of the Tradition, and the second was the Shiʿa or Shiʿites, a name derived from the Arabic Shiʿat ʿAli or the party of ʿAli. Controversy and dispute arose at the Saqīfa¹⁴ assembly following Muhammad’s death over the required qualifications and the precise functions and duties of his successors to lead the Muslim community. Hence, the question of the succession of the Prophet Muhammad was a central issue that divided the Muslim community between those who favored allegiance to successors from the Prophet’s household and those who considered the political leaders of the pre-Islamic era as the more eligible candidates.¹⁵

The Shiʿites stressed the spiritual function of the Prophet’s Caliph or successor, referred to as ’Imām, who reflects the Prophetic Light.¹⁶ According to the Shia, Imāms are divinely safeguarded against error and sin and possess an impeccable and infallible knowledge and understanding of the Qur’ān. They considered members of the Prophet’s family or ’Ahl al-Bayt, basically descendants of his daughter Fatima and her husband ʿAli ibn Abi Talib (the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law), as the only ones qualified to become Imāms. The Shia insisted that Muhammad had on several occasions referred to ʿAli and his male descendants as the righteous successors of the Prophet. One of these occasions, which has been mentioned in authentic and authoritative Shia and Sunni sources, has been interpreted by the Shia as a formal approval and authorization of ʿAli’s right to succession by the Prophet. While on his way back from his last pilgrimage to Mecca, on the eighteenth day of the month Dhul-ḥijja of the eleventh year of his Hijra in 632 A.D., at a place called Ghadīr of Khumm, the Prophet Muhammad reportedly made a crucial declaration, stating: “He for whom I was the master, should hence have ʿAli as his master (fa-hādha ʿAlīyun mawlāh man kuntu mawlāh).”¹⁷ For the Shia, the alleged circumstances that took place at the Ghadīr of Khumm, referred to as Waṣiyyat ʿAli, constituted the single significant piece of evidence on the basis of which they legitimized the succession of ʿAli and his descendants.¹⁸

Although the Sunni Muslims recognize the authenticity of the Ghadīr of Khumm story, they have interpreted the Prophet’s use of the term ‘master’ differently. According to the Sunnis, the term ‘master’ (mawlāh) as used by the Prophet Muhammad on that occasion should be understood as ‘patron’ or ‘friend’ rather than leader. The event of Ghadīr of Khumm was included in the Ibn Ḥanbal’s collection of Ḥadīth (narratives of the Prophet’s words and actions). Nevertheless, most Sunnis who accepted the event as a historical fact largely denied the Shiʿite interpretation of it. The Sunnis believe that the Prophet had left the issue of succession open on purpose, in a bid to provide the Muslim community (’umma) with an opportunity to elect the most qualified person to lead them. In response to the succession crisis, the Sunnis developed a doctrine implicating that the Caliphs were all legitimate successors of the Prophet. They were elected through a political process and were considered as both temporal and religious leaders. However, the Caliphs were not given the same degree of religious authority as the Shiʿites attributed to the Imāms.¹⁹

Regardless of the true intention of the Prophet Muhammad in his proclamation, the Sunni perspective prevailed at the Saqīfa assembly at the time. Subsequently, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, a distinguished and prominent member of the community and Muhammad’s father-in-law, was chosen as the first Caliph (successor) of the Prophet. ʿUmar ibn Khattab, also a close companion of Muhammad and his father-in-law, succeeded al-Saddiq as the second Caliph after being nominated by the latter on his deathbed, followed by ʿUthman ibn ʿAffan, a member of the prominent Umayyad clan at Mecca and the Prophet’s son-in-law, who was elected by a council (majlis). ʿAffan was murdered by a rebel group in 656, and ʿAli ibn Abi Talib received a huge popular support to assume leadership as the last of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (‘al-Khulafā’ ’al-Rāshidūn). Hence, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs or the Rāshidūn include the first four Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet, namely, Abu Bakr (632-4), ʿUmar (634-44), ʿUthman (644-56) and ʿAli (656-661). The expression Rightly-Guided signifies their actions as being accepted by all Muslims as the closest to the Prophet’s example. After the Prophet Muhammad, the words and actions of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs were deemed to be the most authoritative source on Muslim behavior.²⁰

However, by the time ʿAli took charge, the rapidly growing Muslim community had witnessed remarkable changes. The expansion of the Islamic territory brought about greater resources and wealth, where some families and clans assumed new power-contenders and had little sympathy with ʿAli’s insistence on accountability and transparency in the management of the affairs of the Muslim community, and they refused to respond to his call to return to the firm and strict regime applied at the time of the Prophet. ʿAli ibn Abi Talib was murdered in 661 after a five-year Caliphate that was largely marred by civil war, famously known as fitna. Interestingly, during the Prophet’s lifetime, intercommunal conflicts were remarkably contained. The first civil war within the Muslim community erupted during ʿAli’s reign as the fourth Caliph, namely the Battle of the Camel that broke out on the background of the killing of ʿUthman, the third Caliph. The battle took place in Basra, Iraq, in November 656. ʿAisha bint Abu Bakir, Muhammad’s widow, heard about ʿUthman’s death while she was on a pilgrimage to Mecca. During her journey, she decided to head to Kufa in order to discuss the incident with ʿAli, but the situation then developed into an armed battle, as ʿAli asked for time to punish ʿUthman’s murderers. The Battle of the Camel was led by ʿAisha against ʿAli, but she was eventually defeated. The battle became known as the First Fitna or Muslim civil war. ʿAli was later involved in a second, larger, civil war that put him in confrontation with the Umayyads. The tension developed into a major battle known as the Battle of the Ṣiffīn, where ʿAli’s supporters fought against the supporters of Moʿawiya ibn Abi Sufian, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. ʿAli was eventually assassinated by a Khārijite, known as Abdur Rahman ibn Muljam, in January 661 in Kufa. The Khawārij (deviants) were a rebellious sect that emerged during the First Fitna, operating in accordance with the belief that any authority they considered as illegitimate and not abiding by God’s dominion had to be overthrown for “judgement belongs to God alone.”²¹

Following ʿAli’s death, Moʿawiya ibn Abu Sufyan, a close relative of ʿUthman and governor of Syria during ʿUthman’s rule who had been involved in tensions with ʿAli over the Caliphate, announced himself as Caliph in Damascus and established the Umayyad dynasty. However, the Shiʿites refused to recognize Moʿawiya’s declaration and showed support to ʿAli’s sons Hasan and Hussein, considering them the only rightful Caliphs of the community and the sole legitimate successors of the Prophet.²² Hasan, the eldest son of ʿAli, was then forced to sign a peace settlement with Moʿawiya, but despite his weaker position he managed to include an article in the agreement that guarantees the return of the Caliphate to him after the death of Moʿawiya.²³ However, Hasan died mysteriously circa 669,²⁴ and his younger brother Hussein, who opposed the appointment of Moʿawiya’s son Yazid as the next Caliph, was killed by Umayyad forces in Iraq’s Karbala in the year 680. Afterwards, the Shiʿites were excluded from power, and their Imāms, descendants of Hussein ibn ʿAli, were banned from practicing political activities, kept under strict surveillance, arrested or killed by the Caliphs of the two powerful dynasties of Umayyad and Abbasid. The Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) emerged after the collapse of the Rāshidūn Caliphate. It took Damascus as its capital and it was characterized by heredity elections and territorial expansion. It became one of the largest unitary states in history. After overthrowing the Umayyad dynasty, the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) became the third Islamic Caliphate to succeed the Prophet, took Baghdad as its capital and ruled over a large empire for nearly three centuries. Furthermore, in 909, the Fatimid dynasty broke away from the Abbasids and formed a separate line of Caliphs until its decline and eventual collapse in 1171.

In the sixteenth century, with the establishment of the Safavid Dynasty in Iran, the Shiʿites were able for the first time to live under the rule of fellow Shia leaders. Nevertheless, according to the principle of ’Imāmah (Imamate) or the leadership of the infallible Shia Imāms, the rulers won’t enjoy an absolute political legitimacy in the course of waiting for the return of the Twelfth Imām al-Mahdi who, according to the Shiʿite’s belief, has disappeared in the ninth century and will return at the end of time to bring justice to the world. The Awaited Imām al-Mahdi (al-Mahdi al-Muntaẓar) is deemed a kind of Messiah, called al-qā’im or the one who will be raised up by God. His name is Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-ʿAskari, and he was born in the city of Samarra’ in Iraq. Al-Mahdi, according to the Shia, had disappeared at the age of four or eight and he is allegedly still alive. He has several nicknames, including al-Ḥujja (the proof), al-qā’im al-Muntaẓar (the alive and the awaited), and ṣaḥib al-zamān (the owner of the time).²⁵ Thus, until the return of al-Mahdi, the Mujtahids (religious guides) and Fuqahā’ (jurists) of the Shia community would be responsible for the interpretation of all legal issues and doctrines. This strict commitment has continued until the mid-twentieth century, when Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini initiated a radical interpretation of this doctrine, allowing what became known as the Absolute Guardianship of the Faqīh (the jurist), considering him a deputy of the Prophet and the Imāms in not only interpreting the Islamic laws, but also running the state’s affairs on behalf of the Awaited Imām.²⁶ Today, the principle of the Faqīh’s Absolute Guardianship constitutes a crucial part of the current constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the setting up of the Islamic government by Imām Khomeini paved the ground for Shia fuqahā’ to exercise comprehensive authority, and the Imām Khomeini was given power as the faqīh at the highest post in the government to practice his authority in everything that falls within the jurisdiction of the walī al-faqīh. The concept of the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist implies that by occupying the highest post of government the faqīh enjoys all the prerogatives and rights required for governing and there is no difference between him and the infallible Imāms in this case. Furthermore, the Iranian Constitution clearly specifies three powers within the state; the legislative power, the executive power, and the judicial power. Nevertheless, Article 57 of the constitution states that these three powers are set to function under the supervision of the religious absolute guardianship.²⁷

The Caliphate, as a political and religious institution, declined after the thirteenth century, despite the fact that the title Caliph continued to be used by some leaders of the Muslim community through the late stages of the Ottoman Empire, until its formal abolition in 1924 by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the first President of the Turkish Republic. After its elimination, the Caliphate turned into a significant religious and political symbol for some Islamist activists, particularly the Sunnis, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who argued that by undermining the Caliphate, leaders in the Islamic world had abandoned the true path of Islam. This argument has remarkably inspired contemporary orthodox Sunnis to seek a restoration of the Caliphate institution as a way to return to the basic Islamic principles and values. However, the cultural diversity across the Muslim world, which is home to various groups with ethnic, religious, linguistic, socio-economic and political affiliations, constitutes a considerably serious challenge to the re-emergence of any pan-sectarian and centralized Islamic religious leadership.²⁸